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William H. Branson, Jacob A. Frenkel, and 
Morris Goldstein 
Since the finance ministers and  central bank  governors of  the five largest 
industrial  democracies  concluded  the  Plaza  Agreement  in  New  York  in 
September 1985, the theory  and practice of  international economic policy 
coordination has become the subject of  spirited academic and public policy 
debate. To  some, policy coordination represents a watershed in the way that 
countries manage increased economic interdependence, and a foundation upon 
which  an improved international monetary system can  be  constructed. To 
others, policy coordination constitutes merely a minor extension of the more 
long-standing process of international economic policy cooperation, and one 
that carries risks of delaying or otherwise weakening the implementation of 
macroeconomic and structural policies. 
The papers and comments collected in this volume attempt from different 
vantage  points  and  perspectives  to  understand:  what  international policy 
coordination means today and has meant in the past; under what conditions or 
circumstances coordination  is  likely  to  be  beneficial-both  to  the  direct 
participants and to  the rest  of  the world; what  factors most  influence the 
quantitative impact or “effects” of coordination; what obstacles and constraints 
are most relevant for the exercise of coordination in the current and prospective 
global economic environment; what methods of coordination are apt to be most 
or least effective; and, based on the experience of  the European Monetary 
System and of  earlier regimes, in what directions the coordination process 
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might  move  in the future, including  those associated  with greater  fixity of 
exchange rates. 
A somewhat more specific guide to the volume’s contents can be obtained 
from a  snapshot  of  the key  issues  that  emerged from the  papers  and  the 
discussion. 
(1) What does policy coordination mean and what conditions its effects? As 
the conference proceeded, it became apparent that coordination meant different 
things to different participants. In addition, even on identical definitions, there 
remained a divergence  of views on the effects of coordination. 
One  relevant  distinction  is  between  less  and  more  ambitious forms of 
interaction among policy  authorities. The former-which  some participants 
preferred to label “cooperation”  rather than  “coordination”-encompasses 
adoption of a common data base and the exchange of information regarding 
recent developments and policy intentions.  William Branson introduced and 
advocated the use of this distinction. There was a consensus that policy co- 
operation was beneficial. Douglas Purvis, for example, argued that cooperation 
was essential when a country changed its medium-term objectives and initiated 
a dramatic  change in policies,  and when  there  was an  international  crisis, 
financial or otherwise. Policy coordination was interpreted as going further, to 
include agreements among countries to adjust policies in light of shared ob- 
jectives and/or  to implement joint policy  action. It  suffices to say that the 
potential benefits and costs of this more ambitious interaction were subject to 
diverse appraisal. 
The nature of the theoretical case for policy coordination-as  a means of 
internalizing  the  externalities  associated  with  international  spillovers  of 
national policy decisions-was  not at the center of  debate. Instead, it was the 
practice of policy coordination that garnered the most attention. One issue was 
whether a perceived  need to coordinate increased or decreased pressures on 
governments to do the right thing. Supporters of coordination maintained that 
it was hard to see how peer pressure directed at the dangers of  the large U.S. 
budget deficit could have been anything but helpful over the past few years, 
and similarly helpful with respect to coordination’s contribution to motivating 
structural reform in Europe and Japan. Those who felt that the public emphasis 
on coordination could be counterproductive, such as Martin Feldstein, stressed 
that it could provide a political excuse for inaction by shifting the blame for 
poor domestic policy performance to other countries. In a similar vein, some 
participants argued that coordinated firefighting could itself  postpone policy 
action. Stanley Fischer offered the view that by supporting the dollar in 1987, 
concerted foreign-exchange market intervention probably prevented a precip- 
itous fall in the dollar, which might in turn have forced earlier corrective action 
on the U.S. fiscal deficit. 
A number of participants pointed to the limited size of cross-country policy 
multipliers as suggesting that both the gains from policy coordination and the 
incentive to coordinate seriously-especially  for a relatively closed economy 3  Introduction 
like the United States-would  be “small.” Others, however, thought this took 
too narrow  an interpretation of the  scope and effects  of  coordination.  Fred 
Bergsten  argued  that  it  would  be  misleading  to gauge  the  effects  of,  for 
example, the Plaza Agreement without taking into account the protectionist 
counterfactual; without Plaza, we could well have gotten a far more protec- 
tionist U.S.  trade bill than actually ensued. William Branson conjectured that 
economists adopted a narrow  scope for coordination  in order to reduce the 
problem to a size that was manageable  with available tools  (usually,  game 
theory)-but  at a cost of allowing much of the substance to vanish. 
Uncertainty about how the world works was yet another factor that gave rise 
to different views on the feasibility and desirability of coordination.  Jeffrey 
Frankel argued that model uncertainty made it difficult for countries to know 
which policy  changes to ask for and to agree to make. Moreover,  because 
results  might turn out to be different from those expected, such uncertainty 
could lead coordination to reduce welfare rather than increase it. Ralph Bryant 
felt  that  one  should  not  exaggerate  the  degree of  our ignorance  about  the 
consequences of policy actions. He noted that there was no significant empirical 
ambiguity about the sign of the spillover effects of  fiscal policy actions for the 
major industrial countries, and that the magnitude of monetary policy spillover 
effects-whatever  the sign-was  generally acknowledged to be quite small. 
(2) How  frequent and how wide should coordination be? Some participants 
put forward the case that coordination would be most effective when it was a 
regular, ongoing process, which some participants labelled cooperation. Jacob 
Frenkel,  Morris Goldstein, and  Paul  Masson claimed  that multiperiod  bar- 
gaining improved the incentive to fulfill earlier commitments (i.e., increased 
the role of “reputation” in policy agreements) and expanded the opportunities 
for policy  bargains.  Peter Kenen  took  a different  view.  He interpreted the 
postwar  experience  as suggesting that  true coordination  was  likely  only  in 
those  unusual  cases  where there  was  a clearly perceived  need  for regime- 
preserving action. Because the supply of the true coordination was limited, he 
also preferred coordination via rules or accepted codes-of-conduct (as under 
the Bretton Woods regime) since these mechanisms required less discretionary 
coordination. Stanley Fischer found the distinction between policy-optimizing 
and regime-preserving  coordination  suggestive but elusive; he queried what 
regime was being preserved through current efforts at coordination. 
Turning to the width or scope of coordination,  most participants  saw two 
conflicting considerations at work. On the one hand, improved policy perfor- 
mance might require action on fiscal, structural, and regulatory policies, as well 
as on monetary and exchange rate policies. On the other hand, negotiation costs 
across increasing spheres of jurisdiction  can rise rapidly with the number of 
issues under consideration. John Flemming ventured the opinion that the Cooke 
Committee  was  successful  in  getting  an  agreement  on  common  capital- 
adequacy standards for commercial banks because its purview was limited and 
because the preparation  was done by  specialists.  In his view,  prospects for 4  W.  H. BransonIJ. A. FrenkelIM. Goldstein 
success would have been less favorable if coordination on such financial policy 
or regulatory  issues were handled  in a more wide-ranging  forum. 
(3)  Is it better to coordinate around a single indicator rather than around 
many? Jeffrey Frankel argued that the G-7 coordination exercise was flawed. 
If  each  country  had  many  indicators  to  follow  but  only  a  few  policy 
instruments,  the  indicators  would  almost  surely  send  conflicting  signals. 
National authorities would therefore feel no constraint on their setting of policy 
instruments. A single indicator would in his view avoid this problem. Among 
those indicators  that provided  a  nominal  anchor, his  own choice was  for 
internationally coordinated, nominal-domestic-demand targets (to be pursued 
by  monetary  policy).  A  number  of  participants  took  exception  to  this 
single-indicator strategy. Ralph Bryant found no convincing need for author- 
ities to focus on a single intermediate  variable.  He maintained that multiple 
ultimate targets, the use of a variety of intermediate variables as indicators, and 
a direct emphasis on the actual instruments  of policy did not pose  difficult 
analytical problems. In addition, he felt a nominal-income-targeting  strategy 
paid insufficient attention to coordination between monetary and fiscal policies 
within a country. Jacob Frenkel, Moms Goldstein, and Paul Masson noted that 
so long as policy authorities had multiple targets and weighed them differently 
than  their  peers  do,  a  multiple-indicator  system  was  probably  the  only 
politically feasible one. They also expressed  strong reservations about orga- 
nizing  coordination  around  exchange rate  indicators  alone. For one thing, 
exchange rate indicators could  send false signals for monetary policy when 
badly behaved fiscal policies put pressure on exchange rates. Douglas Purvis 
was prepared to give the G-7 multiple-indicator  exercise passing grades if  it 
was seen not as fine-tuning a series of policy targets but rather as putting some 
structure on the cooperative process of consultation and information exchange. 
(4) Is greater management  of  exchange  rates desirable  and, if so,  what 
considerations should guide the identification of  equilibrium exchange rates? 
A host of questions clustered around this broad issue. 
One question was whether greater fixity of exchange rates provided superior 
insulation  against  a  variety  of  shocks.  This was  taken  up in  three  of  the 
conference papers-albeit  with alternative underlying theoretical frameworks 
and, as it turned out, with different findings. Using the IMF’s MULTIMOD 
model (with forward-looking expectations), Jacob Frenkel, Morris Goldstein, 
and Paul Masson found that policy regimes which performed better in the face 
of certain kinds of  shocks fared worse for others, with  no single (exchange 
rate) regime dominating. A conclusion of Jeffrey Frankel’s analysis of shocks 
was that one has to place a high  weight  on exchange rate stability itself to 
demonstrate that a rigid exchange rate rule for monetary policy dominates a 
rigid nominal GNP rule. Finally, employing a portfolio-balance-type  model, 
Peter Kenen reported that fixed exchange rates are to be preferred to floating 
rates for a majority of shocks. 5  Introduction 
A second question is whether the costs of exchange rate misalignment are 
avoidable and undesirable. Some participants, such as Paul Krugman and Fred 
Bergsten, thought they were and that authorities should therefore induce nom- 
inal rates to move in the direction of the long-run, equilibrium real exchange 
rate. Some other participants, however, maintained a skeptical view of a more 
activist role  for exchange rate  management. Michael Mussa,  in  particular, 
argued that it may sometimes be necessary or  desirable  to countenance  exchange 
rate misalignment in order to allow economic policy to pursue objectives more 
important than the rapid achievement of current account equilibrium. His case 
in point  was the  1981-85  real  appreciation  of  the dollar.  He saw the  real 
appreciation  during  1980-82  as an inevitable  consequence of  tighter  U.S. 
monetary  policy  which  was  needed  to bring  down the  U.S.  inflation  rate. 
Moreover, the further appreciation during 1983-84  helped, inter alia, to con- 
tain inflationary pressures that would otherwise have accompanied the strong 
recovery of the U.S. economy from the  1981-1982  recession. 
The ability of economists to identify the equilibrium real exchange rate also 
elicited considerable discussion, Those who argued that official estimates of 
equilibrium rates would be subject to substantial margins of error stressed the 
difficulty  of  defining  a sustainable current account position  as well  as the 
daunting general equilibrium nature of  the exercise. The other camp pointed 
to the successful operation of the European Monetary System and to the larger 
misalignments that might occur in irrational and unmanaged foreign-exchange 
markets. After appraising all the evidence on where the dollar needed to go to 
reach equilibrium, Paul Krugman concluded with a definite “don’t know.” 
Yet  another related question was whether equilibrium  real exchange rates 
would be subject to sizable secular trends because of persistent intercountry 
differences in income elasticities for exports and imports. For example, did the 
oft-observed  higher ratio  of  export-to-import  income elasticity  for Japan, 
relative to the United States, imply a steadily depreciating dollar for equilib- 
rium? Paul Krugman’s answer was no-because  there was a systematic offset 
in growth rates: Japan, on average, grows faster than the United States. What 
counted was  the product of  income elasticities  and growth rates-and  this 
product had been relatively stable over time. Moreover, Krugman argued that 
this stability was consistent  with a specialization  among industrial countries 
that  reflected  increasing  returns rather than  comparative advantage.  Many 
participants felt that the determinants of the paths of long-run equilibrium real 
exchange rates was a fruitful area for further study. 
The ramifications  of  uncertainty associated  with  highly  variable  floating 
exchange rates  also  entered the discussion  of  exchange rate  management. 
Richard Cooper offered the view that any exchange rate system under which 
firm  profitability  was  influenced  much  more by  exchange swings  than  by 
longer-run cost considerations would prove unacceptable to business interests 
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uncertainty was to reduce the number of exchange rates in the world. Larger 
common currency areas would of  course require a high degree of  monetary 
policy coordination within each area. Yet  if different regional interests could 
be accommodated within the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee, why 
could they not  also in, say, a European  central bank? Among the questions 
raised by participants who were not convinced by Cooper’s scenario was how 
real economic shocks would be handled once the nominal exchange rate was 
no longer a policy  instrument; would labor mobility, or the tax and transfer 
system, or capital mobility take on an expanded role? 
(5) Has recent experience with (sterilized)  foreign-exchange market inter- 
vention altered earlier views about its effectiveness? Most participants seemed 
to be in general agreement with the main conclusions of Maurice Obstfeld’s 
examination  of  experience  with  intervention  over the  1985-87  period.  He 
found that: monetary and fiscal actions-not  sterilized intervention-had  been 
the  dominant  determinant  of  broad  exchange rate movements;  the  scale of 
intervention  had  been  too  small  to  have  significant  portfolio  effects;  the 
“signalling effect” of intervention had been effective only when backed up by 
action on policy fundamentals; and the most effective intervention operations 
had  been  “concerted”  ones. John Flemming  was  uncomfortable  with  the 
notion that bonds in different currencies were perfect substitutes since it would 
imply that portfolios would typically be undiversified. Shuntaro Ndmba cited 
econometric  work  at  the  Bank  of  Japan  which  suggested  that  sterilized 
intervention  could  affect  risk  premiums  but  also  that  these  effects  had 
weakened  recently.  Hans  Genberg  was  skeptical  about  the  quantitative 
significance of central banks putting their money where their mouths were and 
put  forward  the  view  that  intervention  operations  may  merely  serve  as a 
“placebo”  for public opinion. Martin Feldstein doubted that either concerted 
intervention or the policy coordination process more generally had contributed 
much to the  1985-87  fall of the dollar. 
(6) Can the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS) be  exported?  A  short 
answer-to  judge  from  the  study  by  Francesco  Giavazzi  and  Albert0 
Giovannini-is  no. They argued that the incentives which countries have to 
belong to the EMS (and to its exchange rate mechanism)-namely,  the high 
degree of trade interdependence and the more comprehensive design of regional 
integration of which the EMS is just an element-are  not present among the 
United States, Europe, and Japan. In addition,  they see the operation of the 
EMS as an (imperfect) greater deutsche mark area, where the Federal Republic 
of Germany practices (near) monetary policy independence. The institution of 
fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates per se cannot in their view  induce in- 
ternational  monetary  cooperation.  While endorsing  their main  conclusions, 
Wolfgang Rieke pointed out that the Bundesbank’s policy independence can 
be limited by external imbalances; in fact, he conjectured that the potential 
inflationary consequences for surplus countries may be more than the corre- 
sponding constraining effects on deficit countries arising from reserve losses 7  Introduction 
through  intervention.  He  also  reiterated  the  view  that  common decision- 
making in the  area of monetary  policy  (2 la European central bank)  would 
cause unease unless price stability was fully accepted as a priority objective. 
Richard Marston acknowledged the role that trade interdependence can play 
in motivating measures to reduce exchange rate variability but emphasized that 
it was only part of the story. Canada, for example, has over 80 percent of its 
trade with the United States but has allowed its exchange rate vis-a-vis  the 
United States to vary substantially-probably  in order to insulate itself from 
disturbances originating in its main trading partner. 
(7) Do  we need greater international coordination ofjinancial policy? Here, 
financial  policy  refers  to  policies  governing  international  and  domestic 
transactions, markets, and institutions,  including the taxation of transactions 
or the returns to capital. The case for more coordination was laid out by David 
Folkerts-Landau.  He argued that the ongoing, largely uncoordinated restruc- 
turing of financial markets can be unstable because of perverse incentives for 
risk  taking  by  financial  institutions.  At  the  same time  that  private  market 
participants were exploiting the greater opportunities for arbitraging regulatory 
and fiscal differences across domestic and international jurisdictions,  financial 
authorities did not reduce-in  fact, they significantly extended-implicit  and 
explicit  liquidity  and  solvency  guarantees  to these  participants.  Francesco 
Pdpadia notes that the implicit ‘‘competition in laxity by supervisory author- 
ities” is a particular risk for Europe of  1990.Folkerts-Landau concludes that, 
if  globalization  and  liberalization  of  financial  .markets  is  not  to  produce 
suboptimal prudential regulation, or suboptimal allocation and pricing of risk, 
greater coordination of financial policy is required. Many participants found 
this line of argument appealing but nevertheless harbored some reservations. 
Papadia argued that coordination would be clearly welfare improving only if 
the regulation were due to  market failure.  Others were concerned about the 
feasibility of  implementing such coordination on a universal basis when there 
was always an incentive for one location not to impose the regulation in order 
to capture a larger share of the world’s business. A third concern was how to 
ensure that efforts at eliminating  “over-insurance’’  for financial institutions 
did not tie the hands of authorities in coordinating their response to an incipient 
financial crisis. 
(8) Does the existence of large multinational corporations (MNCs)  affect the 
behavior of exchange rates and capitalflows? Kenneth Froot approached this 
question by looking both at the financial innovations used by MNCs and at their 
investment decisions. Adopting a Modigliani-Miller-type argument, he main- 
tained that firm financing techniques are basically a “veil”  and that investors 
will not pay the firm  to do anything they can do for themselves. He also found 
some evidence  of a positive relationship between excess volatility of asset prices 
and trading volume (i.e., “noise trading”) at very high frequencies and at short 
horizons. However, MNCs-as  opposed to banks-have  been responsible for 
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to be stabilizing. Foreign direct investment is, in his view,  less sensitive to 
exchange rate uncertainty  than are trade flows. A more powerful instrument 
that  influences  foreign  investment  by  MNCs  is corporate tax  codes. Froot 
illustrated how change in U.S. corporate tax provisions  affected U.S. direct 
investment  inflows and outflows in the  1980s-albeit  not enough to explain 
coincident swings in the dollar. Geoffrey Carliner supported Froot’s conclusion 
that MNCs do not  increase  exchange rate  fluctuations.  Since foreign direct 
investment  by MNCs is dwarfed by  international  flows of  portfolio capital, 
Carliner argued that actions of financial institutions-not  MNCs-need  to be 
placed at center stage in any institutional  actor story of destabilizing capital 
flows. He also made a plea for giving more attention to international coordi- 
nation of tax policies since  international tax competition can produce suboptimal 
outcomes. John Flemming too agreed with the basic thrust of Froot’s analysis. 
He noted that an implication of exchange rate instability militating more strongly 
against trade than against foreign direct investment is that much of undeterred 
investment  displaces  deterred trade. He also took issue with the notion that 
MNCs could contribute to closer adherence to purchasing power parity on two 
counts:  (a) MNCs are not  immune to the  costs of  adjustment  of  switching 
production from one source to another; and (b) to the extent that MNCs have 
market power, they may be well placed to practice price discrimination between 
different markets. 
(9) Are data on current account positions and international indebtedness 
adequate  as indicators of  the  need for policy adjustment? This issue  was 
examined by Lois Stekler, with particular emphasis on the quality of U.S. data. 
To be sure, her work indicated a number of areas where the existing data are 
flawed, ranging from large discrepancies between U.S. and Japanese data on 
purchases of U.S. securities by Japanese residents, to outdated (World War 11) 
benchmark  surveys of U.S. portfolio assets abroad, to the effect of  securiti- 
zation  of  capital  flows  on  shifting  transactions  from  an  on-balance  to 
off-balance-sheet  basis.  In the end, however,  she concluded that the shift of 
the U.S. current account from near balance in the first three years of the 1980s 
to  a deficit of  around  $150  billion  cannot be  accounted  for  by  errors  and 
omissions, and that publicly available data also indicate correctly the direction 
and  rough  order  of  magnitude  of  the  U.S.  net  international  investment 
position. 